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a b s t r a c t
In 1983, Akl and Taylor [Cryptographic solution to a problem of access control in a
hierarchy, ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 1 (3) (1983) 239–248] first suggested
the use of cryptographic techniques to enforce access control in hierarchical structures.
Due to its simplicity and versatility, the scheme has been used, for more than twenty
years, to implement access control in several different domains, including mobile agent
environments and XML documents. However, despite its use over time, the scheme has
never been fully analyzed with respect to security and efficiency requirements. In this
paper we provide new results on the Akl–Taylor scheme and its variants. More precisely:
• We provide a rigorous analysis of the Akl–Taylor scheme. We consider different key
assignment strategies and prove that the corresponding schemes are secure against key
recovery.
• We show how to obtain different tradeoffs between the amount of public information
and the number of steps required to perform key derivation in the proposed schemes.
• We also look at the MacKinnon et al. and Harn and Lin schemes and prove they are
secure against key recovery.
• We describe an Akl–Taylor based key assignment scheme with time-dependent
constraints and prove the scheme efficient, flexible and secure.
• We propose a general construction, which is of independent interest, yielding a key
assignment scheme offering security w.r.t. key indistinguishability, given any key
assignment scheme which guarantees security against key recovery.
• Finally, we show how to use our construction, along with our assignment strategies
and tradeoffs, to obtain an Akl–Taylor scheme, secure w.r.t. key indistinguishability,
requiring a constant amount of public information.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Hierarchical key assignment schemes are widely used to implement secure access control policies in applications where
users and resources can be modeled through partially ordered hierarchies. Since hierarchies are a natural way of organizing
users according to their positions as parts of an organization, they are widely employed in many different application areas
(e.g. database management systems, computer networks, operating systems, military, government communications) and
play a fundamental role within any scenario which can be modeled by using Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
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In 1983, Akl and Taylor [1] suggested the use of cryptographic techniques to enforce access control in hierarchical
structures. In particular, they designed a hierarchical key assignment scheme where each class is assigned an encryption
key that can be used, along with some public parameters, to compute the key assigned to all classes lower down in the
hierarchy. Due to its simplicity and versatility, the Akl–Taylor scheme has been widely used to enforce access control in
several different domains, including mobile agent environments [16] and XML documents [6]. Moreover, it has also been
used as a starting point in the design of key assignment schemes for the enforcement ofmore general access control policies,
including those with transitive and anti-symmetrical exceptions [22,7], as well as those with time-dependent constraints
[21,23]. Furthermore, Asano [2] andAttrapadung andKobara [5] have used theAkl–Taylor scheme in the context of broadcast
encryption.
Akl and Taylor related the security of their scheme to the infeasibility of extracting rth roots modulo n, where r > 1
is an integer and n is the product of two large unknown primes. However, their analysis gives only an intuition for the
security of the scheme. Later on, Goldwasser and Micali [12], introduced the use of security reductions to provide rigorous
security arguments for cryptographic protocols. Security reductions aim at reducing the security of a protocol to the security
of a presumed hard computational problem for which no efficient (i.e., probabilistic polynomial time) solving algorithm is
known. Despite its use for many years, there has been no attempt to fully analyze the security of the Akl–Taylor scheme
according to the Goldwasser–Micali paradigm. The issue of providing rigorous security proofs is very important since many
key assignment schemes have been shown insecure against collusive attacks (see [4] for references).
Atallah et al. [3] first proposed two different notions of security for hierarchical key assignment schemes: security against
key recovery and with respect to key indistinguishability. In the key recovery case, an adversary cannot compute a key which
cannot be derived by the users he has corrupted; whereas, in the key indistinguishability case, the adversary is not even able
to distinguish the key from a random string of the same length. Hierarchical key assignment schemes satisfying the above
notions of security have been proposed in [3,4,8].
1.1. Our contribution
In this paper we analyze the Akl–Taylor scheme as well as some of its variants with respect to security and efficiency
requirements.
Security. We analyze the Akl–Taylor scheme according to the definitions in [3]. We carefully specify how to choose the
public parameters in order to get instances of the scheme which are secure against key recovery under the RSA assumption.
In the Akl–Taylor scheme the complexity of the key derivation increases with the number of classes in the hierarchy.
In order to speed up the key derivation, MacKinnon et al. [17] described a different generation of public values, whereas,
Harn and Lin [14] proposed a variant of the Akl–Taylor schemewhich provides a more efficient key derivation for broad and
shallow hierarchies. We show that also the MacKinnon et al. and the Harn–Lin variants are secure against key recovery.
Similar considerations allow us to prove the security of the Akl–Taylor scheme with a different public values assignment
thatwe call the reduced Akl–Taylor assignment. Schemes using the reduced Akl–Taylor assignment have been used for the en-
forcement ofmore general access control policies, including thosewith transitive and anti-symmetrical exceptions [7,22], as
well as thosewith time-dependent constraints [21,23]. Thus, our arguments also yield formal proofs for schemes in [7,21,23].
We also consider the issue of designing an Akl–Taylor based scheme offering security with respect to key indistinguisha-
bility. Specifically, we propose a general construction, which is of independent interest, yielding a key assignment scheme
offering security with respect to key indistinguishability, given any key assignment scheme which guarantees security
against key recovery.
Efficiency.We show that the Akl–Taylor scheme is still secure when only part of the public information as small as a single
prime number is published. This at the cost of a more expensive key derivation. Thus, we show a tradeoff between the size
of the public information and the complexity of the key derivation.
We point out that Akl–Taylor based schemes, compared with other existing provably-secure schemes, provide better
performances except for the key derivation complexity. In particular, no other provably-secure schemewith time constraints
requires as little public information as that required by time-dependent Akl–Taylor based schemes.
2. The model and definitions
Consider a set of users divided into a number of disjoint classes, called security classes. A security class can represent a
person, a department, or a user group in an organization. A binary relation  that partially orders the set of classes V is
defined in accordance with authority, position, or power of each class in V . The poset (V ,) is called a partially ordered
hierarchy. For any two classes u and v, the notation v  u is used to indicate that the users in u can access v’s data. Clearly,
since u can access its own data, it holds that u  u, for any u ∈ V . We denote by Au the set of nodes to whom node u has
access to, i.e., Au = {v ∈ V : v  u}, for any u ∈ V . The partially ordered hierarchy (V ,) can be represented by the
directed graph G∗ = (V , E∗), where each class corresponds to a vertex in the graph and there is an edge from class u to class
v if and only if v  u. We denote by G = (V , E) theminimal representation of the graph G∗, that is, the directed acyclic graph
corresponding to the transitive and reflexive reduction of the graph G∗ = (V , E∗). Such a graph G has the same transitive and
reflexive closure of G∗, i.e., there is a path (of length greater than or equal to zero) from u to v in G if and only if there is the
edge (u, v) in E∗.
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Definition 2.1. Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies. A hierarchical key assignment
scheme for Γ is a pair (Gen,Der) of algorithms satisfying the following conditions:
1. The information generation algorithm Gen is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ
and a graph G = (V , E) in Γ , and produces as outputs
(a) a private information su and a key ku, for any class u ∈ V ;
(b) a public information pub.
We denote by (s, k, pub) the output of the algorithm Gen(1τ ,G), where s and k denote the sequences of private
information and of keys, respectively.
2. The key derivation algorithm Der is deterministic polynomial-time. It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ , a graph
G = (V , E) in Γ , two classes u ∈ V and v ∈ Au, the private information su assigned to class u and the public information
pub, and outputs the key kv assigned to class v.
We require that for each class u ∈ V , each class v ∈ Au, each private information su, each key kv , each public information
pubwhich can be computed by Gen on inputs 1τ and G, it holds that Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub) = kv.
In order to evaluate the security of the scheme, we consider a static adversary which wants to attack a class v ∈ V and
which is able to corrupt all users not allowed to compute the key kv . We define an algorithm Corruptv which, on input the
private information s generated by the algorithm Gen, extracts the secret values su associated to all classes u in the set of
nodes that do not have access to node v, i.e., Fv = {u ∈ V : v 6∈ Au}. We denote by corrv the sequence output by Corruptv(s).
If A(·, ·, . . .) is any probabilistic algorithm then we denote by a ← A(x, y, . . .) the experiment of running A on inputs
x, y, . . . and letting a be the outcome. Similarly, if X is a set then x ← X denotes the experiment of selecting an element
uniformly at random from X and assigning x this value. A function  : N → R is negligible if for every constant c > 0 there
exists an integer τc such that (τ ) < τ−c for all τ ≥ τc .
We consider two different security goals: against key recovery and with respect to key indistinguishability. In the key
recovery case, the adversary, on input all public information generated by the algorithm Gen, as well as the private
information corrv held by corrupted users, outputs a string k∗v and succeeds whether k∗v = kv . We require that the adversary
will succeed with probability only negligibly different from 1/2length(kv).
Definition 2.2 (REC-ST). Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V , E) ∈ Γ be
a graph and let (Gen,Der) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ . Let STATRECv be a static adversary which attacks a
class v. Consider the following experiment:
Experiment ExpRECSTATv (1
τ ,G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ ,G)
corrv ← Corruptv(s)
k∗v ← STATRECv (1τ ,G, pub, corrv)
return k∗v
The advantage of STATRECv is defined asAdv
REC
STATv (1
τ ,G) = Pr[k∗v = kv]. The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of REC-ST
if, for each graph G = (V , E) in Γ and each class v ∈ V , the function AdvRECSTATv (1τ ,G) is negligible for each static adversary
STATRECv whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
In the key indistinguishability case, two experiments are considered. In the first one, the adversary is given as a challenge
the key kv , whereas, in the second one, it is given a random string ρ having the same length as kv . It is the adversary’s job
to determine whether the received challenge corresponds to kv or to a random string. We require that the adversary will
succeed with probability only negligibly different from 1/2.
Definition 2.3 (IND-ST). Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V , E) be a
graph inΓ , let (Gen,Der) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme forΓ and let STATINDv be a static adversary which attacks
a class v. Consider the following two experiments:
Experiment ExpIND−1STATv (1
τ ,G) Experiment ExpIND−0STATv (1
τ ,G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ ,G) (s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ ,G)
corrv ← Corruptv(s) corrv ← Corruptv(s)
d← STATINDv (1τ,G, pub, corrv, kv) ρ ← {0, 1}length(kv )
return d d← STATINDv (1τ,G, pub, corrv, ρ)
return d
The advantage of STATINDv is defined as
AdvINDSTATv (1
τ ,G) = |Pr[ExpIND−1STATv (1τ ,G) = 1] − Pr[ExpIND−0STATv (1τ ,G) = 1]|.
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-ST if, for each graph G = (V , E) in Γ and each v ∈ V , the function
AdvINDSTATv (1
τ ,G) is negligible, for each static adversary STATINDv whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
In Definitions 2.2 and 2.3 we have considered a static adversary attacking a class. A different kind of adversary, the
adaptive one, could also be considered. Such an adversary is first allowed to access all public information aswell as all private
information of a number of users of its choice; afterwards, it chooses the class u against which the attack will be mounted.
In [4] it has been proven that security against adaptive adversaries is (polynomially) equivalent to security against static
adversaries. Hence, in this paper we will only consider static adversaries.
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3. Complexity assumptions
An RSA generatorwith associated security parameter τ is a randomized algorithm that returns a pair ((n, e), (n, p, q, d)),
where n is the RSAmodulus, e is the encryption exponent and d is the decryption exponent, satisfying the following conditions:
• p and q are two distinct large odd primes of τ bits;
• n = p · q;
• e ∈ Z∗φ(n), where φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q− 1);
• d = e−1 mod φ(n).
Two strategies to compute the pair ((n, e), (n, p, q, d)) are used. The former, first chooses the primes p and q, computes n,
picks e at random in Z∗φ(n), and computes d accordingly. Such a strategy yields a random exponent RSA generator, denoted
KranRSA(1
τ ). The latter, fixes the encryption exponent e to be a small odd number, like 3, 17, or 216 + 1, and then generates the
other parameters, accordingly.1 Given a fixed odd number e, such a strategy yields an RSA generator for exponent e, denoted
KfixRSA(1
τ , e). The random exponent RSA generators KranRSA(1
τ ) and KfixRSA(1
τ , e), are described as follows:
Algorithm KranRSA(1
τ ) Algorithm KfixRSA(1
τ , e)
pick at random two distinct primes repeat
p and q of τ bits pick at random two distinct primes
n← p · q p and q of τ bits
φ(n)← (p− 1) · (q− 1) until gcd (p− 1, e) = 1 and gcd (q− 1, e) = 1
e← Z∗φ(n) n← p · q
d← e−1 mod φ(n) φ(n)← (p− 1) · (q− 1)
return ((n, e), (n, p, q, d)) d← e−1 mod φ(n)
return ((n, e), (n, p, q, d))
Let B andGrsa be algorithmswhere the algorithmGrsa corresponds either toKranRSA(1
τ ) or toKfixRSA(1
τ , e). Consider the following
experiment:
Experiment ExpGrsaB
((n, e), (n, p, q, d))← Grsa
x← Z∗n
y← xe mod n
x′ ← B(n, e, y)
if x′ = x then return 1
else return 0
The advantage of B is defined as AdvGrsaB = Pr[ExpGrsaB = 1].
The RSA generators described above yield the following two assumptions.2
Random Exponent RSA Assumption. The function Adv
KranRSA
B (1
τ ) is negligible, for each probabilistic algorithm Bwhose time
complexity is polynomial in τ .




τ , e) is negligible, for each probabilistic algorithm Bwith time complexity polynomial in τ .
4. The Akl–Taylor scheme
In this section we describe the Akl and Taylor scheme [1].
Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies, and let G = (V , E) ∈ Γ .
Algorithm Gen(1τ ,G):
1. Randomly choose two distinct large primes p and q having bitlength τ and compute n = p · q;
2. For each class v ∈ V , compute an integer tv , such that tu divides tv if and only if v ∈ Au (more details are provided immediately after
the description of the algorithms);
3. Let pub be the sequence of public information computed in the previous step, along with the value n;
4. Randomly choose a secret value k0, where 1 < k0 < n;
5. For each class v ∈ V , compute the private information sv and the encryption key kv as follows:
sv = kv = ktv0 mod n;
6. Let s and k be the sequences of private information and keys, respectively, computed in the previous step;
7. Output (s, k, pub).
1 There have been some questions raised about the security of this strategy, since it might be possible that roots of small degree are easier to take than
roots of a random degree.
2 To the best of our knowledge, in the literature there is no analysis of the relationships between the security of these two different strategies.
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Fig. 1. A partially ordered hierarchy and one of its chain decomposition.
Algorithm Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub)
Extract the values tv and tu from pub and compute
stv/tuu mod n = (ktu0 )tv/tu mod n = kv .
A crucial issue is how to perform step 2. of Algorithm Gen(1τ ,G). Akl and Taylor [1] and MacKinnon et al. [17] proposed two different
public values assignments such that for each pair of public values tu and tv , the value tu divides tv if and only if v ∈ Au.
The Akl–Taylor assignment. For each v ∈ V , choose a distinct prime number pv and compute the public value tv as follows:
tv =
 1 if Av = V ;∏
u6∈Av
pu otherwise.
The MacKinnon et al. assignment. Decompose the partially ordered hierarchy G = (V , E) into disjoint chains (a chain is a totally
ordered set) and assign each chain a distinct prime number.3 Then, for each v ∈ V , compute the prime power nv = pi, where v is the ith
class in the chain whose assigned prime is p. Finally, for each class v ∈ V , compute the public value tv as follows:
tv =
{
1 if Av = V ;
lcmu6∈Avnu otherwise.
The left-hand side of Fig. 1 shows a partially ordered hierarchy, whereas, one of its chain decomposition is shown the right-hand side.
Example of the Akl–Taylor assignment. Consider the hierarchy on the left-hand side of Fig. 1, when the primes assigned to the classes
are pa = 3, pb = 5, pc = 7, pd = 11, pe = 13. The public values are ta = 5, tb = 3 · 7, tc = 3 · 5 · 11, td = 3 · 5 · 7, te = 3 · 5 · 7 · 11.
Example of the MacKinnon assignment. Consider the chain decomposition shown in Fig. 1, when the prime powers assigned to the
classes are na = 3, nb = 5, nc = 32, nd = 52, ne = 53. The public values are ta = 5, tb = 32, tc = 3 · 52, td = 32 · 5, te = 32 · 52.
Akl and Taylor noticed that in order to construct an Akl–Taylor scheme which is resistant to collusive attacks it is needed that for each
v ∈ V and each X ⊆ Fv , gcd{tu : u ∈ X} does not divide tv . Indeed, they showed the following result:
Lemma 4.1 ([1]). Let t and t1, . . . , tm be integers, and let k ∈ Zn, where n = p · q is the product of two large primes. The power kt mod n can
be feasibly computed from the set of powers {kt1 mod n, . . . , ktm mod n} if and only if gcd{t1, . . . , tm} divides t.
The proof of Lemma 4.1 relies on the infeasibility of extracting rth rootsmodulo n, where r > 1 is an integer and n is the product of two
large unknown primes.4 Lemma 4.1 gives an intuition for the security of the scheme but it has never been shownwhether the existence of
an efficient adversary breaking the security of the scheme in the sense of REC-ST implies the existence of an adversary which efficiently
solves a computational hard problem.
4.1. Proving the security of the Akl–Taylor scheme
In this section we show that the Akl–Taylor scheme, according to both Akl–Taylor andMacKinnon et al. assignments, is secure against
key recovery provided that the primes associated to the classes are properly chosen.
In the followingwe describe two primes choices. The first choice, denoted fixed primes choice, yields instances of the Akl–Taylor scheme
secure under the RSA assumption for exponent in a set of odd numbers. The second one, denoted R-random primes choice, yields instances
secure under the random exponent RSA assumption.
• Fixed primes choice. Let PRIMES` = {p1, . . . , p` } be the set of the first ` prime numbers greater than two.
– Let u1, . . . , u|V | be a sorting of V . In the Akl–Taylor assignment, associate prime pj ∈ PRIMES|V | to class uj, for each j = 1, . . . , |V |.
– Let m be the number of disjoint chains in the minimal decomposition of G and let uj be the first node of the jth chain. In the
MacKinnon et al. assignment, associate prime pj ∈ PRIMESm to class uj, for each j = 1, . . . ,m.
• R-Random primes choice. Let R = {Rn}n be a family of sets of integers, where n is an RSAmodulus. In the Akl–Taylor assignment (in the
MacKinnon et al. assignment, resp.), choose uniformly at random, for each class (for each chain in the minimal chain decomposition of
the partially ordered hierarchy, resp.), a distinct prime number in Rn, for an appropriately chosen family R.
3 The problem of finding a decomposition into a minimal number of chains is solvable in time polynomial in |V | (for example by using Khachiyan’s
algorithm [15]).
4 In particular, when gcd(r, φ(n)) = 1, where φ(n) is the Euler’s totient function, this is the assumption behind the RSA cryptosystem [19]; whereas, if
r = 2, this assumption is used in the Rabin cryptosystem [18].
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The Akl–Taylor assignment.We start by considering the fixed primes choice for the Akl–Taylor assignment. It holds that:
Theorem 4.2. Let G = (V , E) be a partially ordered hierarchy. The Akl–Taylor assignment with the fixed primes choice yields a scheme which
is secure in the sense of REC-ST under the RSA assumption for exponents in PRIMES|V |.
Proof. We show how to turn a polynomial-time static adversary breaking the security of the Akl–Taylor scheme in the sense of REC-ST,
when the public parameters are chosen according to the fixed primes choice, into a polynomial-time adversary B breaking the RSA
assumption for exponents in PRIMES|V |.
Let e ∈ PRIMES|V | and assume, w.l.o.g., that e = pi. Let u1, . . . , u|V | be a sorting of the classes in V . Assume that there exists a static
adversary STATui which is able to compute, with non-negligible advantage, the key kui held by the class ui in the Akl–Taylor scheme. We
construct a polynomial-time adversary B that, on input a triple (n, e, y), where n is chosen according to the RSA generator KfixRSA(1
τ , e), uses
the adversary STATui to compute, with non-negligible advantage, a value x ∈ Z∗n such that y = xe mod n. The adversary B is described in
the following.
Algorithm B(n, e, y)
1. Construct the inputs for STATui as follows:
(a) For each j = 1, . . . , |V |, assign prime pj to class uj (notice that pi = e is assigned to ui);
(b) For each j = 1, . . . , |V |, compute the integer tuj =
∏
z 6∈Auj pz (tuj = 1 if Auj = V );
(c) Set pub to be the sequence of public information computed in the previous step, along with the value n;
(d) For each class v ∈ Fui , compute the key kv = ytv/pi mod n;
(e) Set corrui to be the sequence of keys computed in the previous step;
2. Let kui be the output of STATui on input (1
τ ,G, pub, corrui );
3. Use Extended Euclidean Algorithm to compute integers α and β such that pi · α + tui · β = gcd(pi, tui ) = 1 (see [20]);
4. Compute x = yα · kβui mod n = xpi·α mod n · xtui ·β mod n = xpi·α+tui ·β mod n;
5. Output x.
Notice that, in step. 1.(d), the key kv can be computed, since pi divides tv . Moreover, STATui ’s view in the above simulation is identically
distributed as the one obtained in a real execution of the schemewith the fixed primes choice, and all the computations needed to construct
such a view can be performed in polynomial time. Finally, it is easy to see that Adv
KfixRSA
B (1
τ , e) = AdvSTATui (1τ ). Since AdvSTATui (1τ ) is non-
negligible, the theorem holds. 
Let us consider the R-random primes choice for the Akl–Taylor assignment. The next result establishes a lower bound for the Euler
totient function φ(n), when n is an RSA modulus obtained as the product of two large distinct primes having bitlength τ . More precisely:
Lemma 4.3. Let p and q two large distinct primes having bitlength τ and let n = p · q. The Euler totient function φ(n) satisfies
φ(n) > 22τ−2 − 2τ .
Proof. Let p and q two large primes having bitlength τ . Thus, p, q > 2τ−1. Therefore,
φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q− 1) = p · q− p− q+ 1
> 22τ−2 − 2 · 2τ−1 = 22τ−2 − 2τ . 
We fix the family R in the R-random primes choice by setting Rn equal to the set of integers belonging to the interval [3, w], where
w = 22τ−2 − 2τ . Therefore, to avoid overburdening the notation, in the following we will refer to the R-random primes choice simply as
to the random primes choice.
The following result holds:
Theorem 4.4. Let G = (V , E) be a partially ordered hierarchy. The Akl–Taylor assignment with the random primes choice yields a scheme
secure in the sense of REC-ST under the random exponent RSA assumption.
In order to prove Theorem 4.4 we need some results from Number Theory, which can be found in [13]. Let x be a positive integer and
let pi(x) be the prime counting function, i.e., the number of prime numbers less than or equal to x. The Prime Number Theorem states that
pi(x) has asymptotic behavior pi(x) ∼ x/ ln x, where ln x denotes the natural logarithm of x. In particular, for any x ≥ 17 it holds that
pi(x) > x/ ln x. (1)
The number of different prime factors of an integer x is denoted by ω(x) and has normal order log log x (see [13, pag. 356]). In particular,
Erdős and Pomerance [9] proved that the number of prime factors of φ(n) has normal order (log log n)2/2, that is, ω(φ(n)) satisfies
(1− ) (log log n)
2
2




for each  > 0 and almost all values of n. This means that there might be an exceptional infinitesimal set of values, i.e., o(n) values, for
which the above inequalities are false, and this exceptional set will naturally depend upon .
The next result shows that the probability of choosing a prime number pv ∈ [3, w]which is not relatively prime to φ(n) is negligible.
Lemma 4.5. Let w = 22τ−2 − 2τ , and let Pw = {a < w : a is prime}. For almost all RSA modulus n having bitlength at most 2τ , the fraction
|Pw − Qw|/|Pw|, where Qw = {a < w : a is prime and gcd(a, φ(n)) = 1}, is a negligible function in τ .
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Proof. Notice that |Pw| = pi(w), i.e., the number of prime numbers less than or equal to w, and |Qw| ≥ |Pw| − ω(φ(n)), with equality










(from (1) and (2))




We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Assume there exists a static adversary STATu which is able to compute, with non-negligible advantage, the key ku held by a class u ∈ V
in the Akl–Taylor scheme, when the public parameters are chosen according to the random primes choice. We construct a polynomial-
time adversary B that, on input a triple (n, e, y), where n and e are chosen according to the random exponent RSA generator KranRSA(1
τ ), uses
the adversary STATu to compute, with non-negligible advantage, a value x ∈ Z∗n such that y = xe mod n. Let PRIMES denote the set of
prime numbers. The adversary B is described in the following.
Algorithm B(n, e, y)
If e 6∈ [3, w] ∩ PRIMES then output ‘failed’
else
1. Set pu = e and for each class v ∈ V \ {u}, choose uniformly at random a distinct prime number pv in [3, w] ∩ (PRIMES \ {e});
2. For each class v ∈ V , compute the integer tv =∏z 6∈Av pz (tv = 1 if Av = V );
3. Set pub to be the sequence of public information computed in the previous step, along with the value n;
4. For each class v ∈ Fu, compute the key kv = y
tv
pu mod n;
5. Set corru to be the sequence of keys computed in the previous step;
6. Let ku be the output of STATu on input (1τ ,G, pub, corru);
7. Use Extended Euclidean Algorithm to compute integers α and β such that pu · α + tu · β = gcd(pu, tu) = 1 (see [20]);
8. Compute x = yα mod n · kβu mod n = yα mod n · (y1/pu )tu·β mod n = xpu·α mod n · xtu·β mod n = xpu·α+tu·β mod n;
9. Output x.
Notice that, in step 4., the key kv can be computed, since pu divides tv .
LetAdvSTATu (1τ ) denote the advantage of the adversary STATu of breaking the Akl–Taylor schemewhen the primes assigned to the classes
are chosen according to the Akl–Taylor assignment with random primes choice and let Adv′STATu (1τ ) be the advantage over the choices
where pu satisfies gcd(pu, φ(n)) = 1. Due to Lemma 4.5, if AdvSTATu (1τ ) is non-negligible, then STATu breaks the schemewhen the prime
pu is such that gcd(pu, φ(n)) = 1. Indeed, if STATu were able to break only on assignments where pu satisfies gcd(pu, φ(n)) 6= 1, then
AdvSTATu (1τ ) would have been overall negligible. Hence, ‘‘ since w = 22τ−2 − 2τ and φ(n), w, n < 22τ , for any constant c > 2 and




τ ) = Prob(e ≤ w is a prime and gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1) · Adv′STATu (1τ )
= pi(w)− ω(φ(n))
φ(φ(n))





· Adv′STATu (1τ ) (from (1))
≥ w − lnw · ω(φ(n))





2·τ−2 − 2τ − 2 · τ · ω(φ(n))





2·τ−2 − 2τ − τ · (1+ ) · (log log n)2)
2 · τ · 22·τ · Adv
′
STATu (1
τ ) (from (2))
≥ 2
2·τ−2 − 2τ − O(τ 3)





2·τ−2 − O(2τ )









Since Adv′STATu (1τ ) is non-negligible also Adv
KranRSA
B (1
τ ) is non-negligible. This concludes the proof. 
The MacKinnon et al. assignment. Consider the fixed primes choice for the MacKinnon et al. assignment. Next result holds:
Theorem 4.6. Let G = (V , E) be a partially ordered hierarchy, and let m be the number of chains of a decomposition of G. The MacKinnon et
al. assignment with the fixed primes choice in PRIMESm yields a scheme which is secure in the sense of REC-ST under the RSA assumption for
exponents in PRIMESm.
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Proof. Let e ∈ PRIMESm and assume, w.l.o.g., that e = pi. Let uj be the first node of the jth chain, for j = 1, . . . ,m. Assume that there
exists a static adversary STATu which is able to compute, with non-negligible advantage, the key ku held by the class u in the Akl–Taylor
scheme, where u is the `th class in the ith chain. We construct a polynomial-time adversary B that, on input a triple (n, e, y), where n is
chosen according to the RSA generator KfixRSA(1
τ , e), uses the adversary STATu to compute, with non-negligible advantage, a value x ∈ Z∗n
such that y = xe mod n. The adversary B is described in the following.
Algorithm B(n, e, y)
1. Construct the inputs for STATu as follows:
(a) For each j = 1, . . . ,m, assign pj to class uj (notice that pi = e is assigned to ui);
(b) For each v ∈ V , compute the prime power nv = pj`, where v is the `th class in the jth chain;
(c) For each class v ∈ V , compute the public value tv as follows:
tv =
{
1 if Av = V ;
lcmu6∈Avnu otherwise.
(d) Set pub to be the sequence of public information computed in the previous step, along with the value n;
(e) For each class v ∈ Fu, compute the key kv = (y1/e` )tv mod n;
(f) Set corru to be the sequence of keys computed in the previous step;
2. Let ku be the output of STATu on input (1τ ,G, pub, corru);
3. Use Extended Euclidean Algorithm to compute integers α and β such that pu · α + tu · β = gcd(e, tu/e`−1) = 1 (see [20]);
4. Compute x = yα mod n · kβu mod n = yα mod n · (y1/e` )tu·β mod n = xe·α mod n · x(tu/e`−1)·β mod n = xe·α+(tu/e`−1)·β mod n;
5. Output x.
Notice that, in step. 1.(e), the key kv can be computed, since e` divides tv . Moreover, notice that gcd(e, tu/e`−1) = 1, since e`−1 is the prime
power associated to the classwhich precedes u in the chain, towhom u has not access to.STATu’s view in the above simulation is identically
distributed to the view obtained in a real execution of the scheme with the proposed assignment and all the computations needed to
construct such a view can be performed in polynomial time. Finally, it holds that Adv
KfixRSA
B (1
τ , e) = AdvSTATu (1τ ). Since AdvSTATu (1τ ) is
non-negligible, the theorem holds. 
Notice that we can also consider the MacKinnon et al. assignment with the random primes choice. Along the same lines of the proof
of Theorem 4.4, we can show that the corresponding Akl–Taylor scheme instance is secure under the random exponent RSA assumption.
4.2. Reducing public information in the Akl–Taylor scheme
Notice that the primes, which are randomly chosen in [3, w], do not need to be independent from each other. Thus, we introduce a
modified random primes choice for the Akl–Taylor assignment, which works as follows:
1. Let u1, . . . , u|V | be a sorting of V ;
2. Choose uniformly at random a prime p1 in [3, w];
3. For j = 1, . . . , |V | − 1, compute pj+1 ∈ [3, w] as the jth prime greater than p1;
4. For j = 1, . . . , |V |, assign prime pj to class uj.
Notice that if the prime p1 is too close tow, then [p1, w] could not contain the |V |−1 primes needed for the other classes. If this event
occurs, the generation of primes continues in [3, p1].
Theorem 4.7. The Akl–Taylor assignment with the modified random primes choice yields a scheme which is secure in the sense of REC-ST
under the random exponent RSA assumption.
Proof. Let B be an adversary defined as follows:
Algorithm B(n, e, y)
If e 6∈ [3, w] ∩ PRIMES then output ‘failed’
else construct the inputs for STATui as follows:
1. Set pi = e and compute the sequence of primes p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , p|V | as follows:
(a) for j = 1, . . . , i− 1, the prime pi−j is the jth prime smaller than pi in [3, w];
(b) for j = 1, . . . , |V | − i, the prime pi+j is the jth prime greater than pi in [3, w];
2. For each class j = 1, . . . , v, assign pj to class uj and compute the integer tuj =
∏
z 6∈Auj pz (tuj = 1 if Auj = V );
3. Set pub to be the sequence of public information computed in the previous step, along with the value n;
4. For each class v ∈ Fui , compute the key kv = ytv/pi mod n;
5. Set corrui to be the sequence of keys computed in the previous step;
6. Let kui be the output of STATui on input (1
τ ,G, pub, corrui );
7. Use Extended Euclidean Algorithm to compute integers α and β such that pi · α + tui · β = gcd(pi, tui ) = 1 (see [20]);
8. Compute x = yα mod n · kβui mod n = yα mod n · (y1/pi )tui ·β mod n = xpi·α mod n · xtui ·β mod n = xpi·α+tui ·β mod n;
9. Output x.
It is easy to check that the view the adversary STATui has when interacts with B is identically distributed to the view it gets during a
real execution of the Akl–Taylor scheme. Moreover, along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 4.4, we can prove that the advantage of
adversary B is negligible. 
With the modified random primes choice, only the first prime needs to be published, along with the modulus n. Indeed, such public
information allows each class to compute the other primes and the sequence of integers tv ’s needed for key derivation. These computations
can be performed efficiently (see [2] where a similar technique was employed). Notice that, in the modified random primes choice, i ≥ 2
primes of the sequence p1, . . . , p|V | might be published. Then, each class v has to compute the |V | − i missing primes accordingly, by
performing on average O((|V | − i) · τ) steps to compute the full sequence. This allows to obtain a tradeoff between the size of the public
information and the number of steps required to perform key derivation.
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5. Enforcing more general access control policies
Due to its simplicity and versatility, the Akl–Taylor scheme has been used as a starting point in the design of key assignment schemes
for the enforcement of more general access control policies, including those with transitive and anti-symmetrical exceptions [7,22], as
well as those with time-dependent constraints [21,23]. As shown in [4,7], such policies can be represented by a directed acyclic graph
G = (V,E)with V = R∪N , where R and N denote the set of root classes and non-root classes, respectively. In particular, the classes in R do
not need to be assigned encryption keys, since they have no data to be protected.
Given a graphG = (V , E), where V = R∪N , consider the following assignment,whichwe refer to as the reduced Akl–Taylor assignment:
1. For each class u ∈ R, let pu = 1;
2. For each class v ∈ N , choose a distinct prime number pv;
3. For each class u ∈ V , compute the public value tu as done in the Akl–Taylor assignment.
The reduced assignment satisfies the property that, for each v ∈ N , gcd{tu : u ∈ Fv} does not divide tv (see [7]). Moreover, the
assignment is similar to the Akl–Taylor one, but needs a smaller amount of public information, i.e. |N| primes instead than |V |, since
primes are assigned only to non-root classes (this is the reason why the assignment is said to be reduced).
Examples of Akl–Taylor based schemes using the reduced assignment can be found in [7,21,23]. More precisely, the constructions in
[7,21] first transform the graph representing the access control policy into a bipartite graph corresponding to a two-level partially ordered
hierarchy, where the classes at the first level are root classes, whereas, those at the second level correspond to non-root classes. Then, the
Akl–Taylor scheme with the reduced assignment is used on such a hierarchy. The construction in [23] is essentially the same as the one
proposed in [21], but uses a different graph transformation.
The next remark will be useful when analyzing the security of the reduced assignment.
Remark 5.1. Let G = (V , E), with V = R ∪ N , be a graph corresponding to a partially ordered hierarchy and let pv denote the prime
associated to class v ∈ V by the Akl–Taylor assignment. Consider two instances of the Akl–Taylor scheme using the Akl–Taylor assignment
and the Akl–Taylor reduced assignment where each class v ∈ N is assigned the prime pv , respectively. Let k′0 (k′′0 , resp.) denote the secret





denote the key assigned to class v by the first (second, resp.) instance of the scheme.




v∈R pv mod n, then
• k′′v = (k′v)pv mod n, for any v ∈ R;
• k′′v = k′v , for any v ∈ N .
For example, consider the hierarchy of Fig. 1, where R = {a, b}. The keys assigned to the classes by the first instance are k′a =
(k′0)pb mod n, k
′
b = (k′0)pa·pc mod n, k′c = (k′0)pa·pb·pd mod n, k′d = (k′0)pa·pb·pc mod n, k′e = (k′0)pa·pb·pc ·pd mod n, whereas, those
assigned by the second instance are k′′a = k′′0 = (k′a)pa mod n, k′′b = (k′′0)pc mod n = (k′b)pb mod n, k′′c = (k′′0)pd mod n = k′c ,
k′′d = (k′′0)pc mod n = k′d, k′′e = (k′′0)pc ·pd mod n = k′e.
The next result holds:
Theorem 5.2. The reduced Akl–Taylor assignment with the fixed primes choice yields an Akl–Taylor scheme which is secure in the sense of
REC-ST, with respect to classes in N, under the RSA assumption for exponents in PRIMES|N|.
Proof. We show how to turn a polynomial-time static adversary breaking the security of the Akl–Taylor scheme in the sense of REC-ST,
when the public parameters are chosen according to the reduced Akl–Taylor assignment with fixed primes choice, into a polynomial-time
static adversary breaking the security of the Akl–Taylor scheme in the sense of REC-ST, when the public parameters are chosen according
to the Akl–Taylor scheme with the fixed primes choice. Then, the theorem follows from Theorem 4.2.
Assume that there exists a static adversary STAT
′′
u which is able to compute, with non-negligible advantage, the key k
′′
u held by a non-
root class in G′′ = (V ′′, E ′′) in the Akl–Taylor scheme when the reduced assignment with the fixed primes choice is used. We construct
an adversary STAT′v(1τ ,G′, pr ′, corr ′v), where G′ = (V ′, E ′) and pr ′ denote the sequence of primes assigned to the classes in V ′ (recall that
the sequence pub′ of integers can be easily computed from pr ′, with at most O(|V ′|2) operations), as follows:
Algorithm STAT′v(1τ ,G′, pr ′, corr ′v)
1. Construct an input instance for STAT
′′
u(1




v∈R′′ pv mod n,where R′′
denotes the set of root classes in G′′, as follows
(a) Let G′′ = G′;
(b) Let pr ′′ be the subsequence of pr ′ containing the primes assigned to non-root classes in V ′′ \ R′′;
(c) Let u = v be the class to be attacked;
(d) Let corr ′′u be the keys held by corrupted users. From Remark 5.1, such keys can be easily constructed from corr ′v;
2. Let k
′′
u be the output of STAT
′′
u on inputs (1
τ ,G′′, pr ′′, corr ′′u );
3. Output k
′
u = k′′u .
It is easy to see that STAT′v has exactly the same advantage of STAT′′u in breaking the Akl–Taylor scheme. Therefore, the theorem follows
from Theorem 4.2. 
Along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 5.2, we can show that the Akl–Taylor schemewith the fixed primes choice is secure (with
respect to classes in N) under the random exponent RSA assumption.
We point out that the Akl–Taylor schemewith the reduced assignment allows to obtain key assignment schemeswith time-dependent
constraintswhich requires a small amount of public information (see [21,23]). Hence, Theorem5.2 provides a formal proof for the schemes
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in [21,23]. In such schemes each user may be assigned to a class for an arbitrary subset of time periods. The idea is the following: let
G = (V , E) be a graph representing a partially ordered hierarchy and let T be a sequence of time periods. Consider a two-level hierarchy
G′ = (V ′, E ′)where V ′ = R∪ N , |R| = |V | · 2|T | and |N| = |V | · |T |. For each class v ∈ V and each subset Q ⊆ T , there is a root class vQ in
R; whereas, for each v ∈ V and each time period t ∈ T , there is a non-root class vt ∈ N . Whenever a user is assigned to a class u ∈ V for
a subset Q ⊆ T of time periods, it receives the private information held by class uQ , which allows to compute the key kv,t , for any v ∈ Au
and any t ∈ Q . The amount of public information required by the scheme is |V | · |T | values, independently of the number of root classes
in R. No other scheme with time-dependent constraints has the same performance. For example, the encryption based construction in [4]
requires O(|V | · |T |3) public values in the simplest case where each user is assigned to a class for a time-interval and O(|V | · 2|T |) values if
arbitrary subsets of time periods are considered.
6. The Harn–Lin scheme
In 1990, Harn and Lin [14] proposed a key assignment scheme similar to the Akl–Taylor scheme. Their scheme, however, uses a bottom-
up key generation process, instead of using a top-down strategy as in the Akl–Taylor scheme. The advantage of their solution is that the
size of the public integers tv ’s assigned to the classes is smaller than that in the Akl–Taylor scheme, yielding amore efficient key derivation
for broad and shallow hierarchies. The scheme is described in the following.
Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies and let G = (V , E) ∈ Γ .
Algorithm Gen(1τ ,G)
1. Randomly choose two distinct large primes p and q, having bitlength τ , and compute n = p · q and φ(n) = (p− 1)(q− 1);
2. For each class v ∈ V , choose a distinct prime number ev , such that gcd(ev, φ(n)) = 1, and compute a public value tv =∏u∈Av eu;
3. Let pub be the sequence of public information computed in the previous step, along with the modulus n;
4. For each class v ∈ V , compute the secret integer dv , such that ev · dv = 1 mod φ(n);
5. Choose a random integer k0, such that gcd(k0, n) = 1;
6. For each class v ∈ V , compute the private information sv and the encryption key kv as follows:




7. Let s and k be the sequences of private information and keys, respectively, computed in the previous steps;
8. Output (s, k, pub).
Algorithm Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub)
1. Extract the values tu and tv from pub;
2. Compute
(su)tu/tv mod n = kv .
Example of Harn–Lin public values. Consider the hierarchy of Fig. 1, when the primes assigned to the classes are the same as the Akl–
Taylor assignment above. The public values associated to the classes are ta = 3 · 7 · 11 · 13, tb = 5 · 11 · 13, tc = 7 · 13, td = 11 · 13,
te = 13.
Harn and Lin [14] claimed that the security of their scheme is equivalent to that of the RSA cryptosystem. In particular, they analyzed the
problem of computing the key kv held by a class v ∈ V starting from the keys held by a coalition of children of v. However, they did not
consider attacks carried out by different kinds of coalitions.
By using a reduction to the Akl–Taylor scheme we prove that, when the public parameters are properly chosen, the Harn–Lin scheme
is secure against key recovery. Let kAT0 and k
HL
0 be the secret value k0 chosen in step 4. of the Akl–Taylor and in step 5. of the Harn–Lin
scheme, respectively. The intuition behind our proof is that an instance of the Akl–Taylor scheme yields an instance of the Harn–Lin scheme
where kHL0 = (kAT0 )
∏
u∈V pu mod n. Indeed, with this setting, the key kHLv assigned to v by the Harn–Lin scheme is equal to that assigned to
v by the Akl–Taylor scheme:
kHLv = (kHL0 )
∏




u∈Av du mod n = (kAT0 )
∏
u6∈Av pu mod n = kATv .
The next result holds:
Theorem 6.1. The fixed primes choice in PRIMES|V | yields an Harn–Lin schemewhich is secure in the sense of REC-ST under the RSA assumption
for exponents in PRIMES|V | .
Proof. We show how to turn a polynomial-time static adversary breaking the security of the Harn–Lin scheme in the sense of REC-ST,
when the public parameters are chosen according to the fixed primes choice, into a polynomial-time static adversary breaking the security
of the Akl–Taylor scheme in the sense of REC-ST. Thus, the theorem follows from Theorem 4.2.
Assume that there exists a static adversary STATHLu which is able to compute, with non-negligible advantage, the key k
HL
u held by a
class u ∈ V in the Harn–Lin scheme when the fixed primes choice is used. We construct an adversary STATATv (1τ ,G′, pr ′, corr ′v), where
pr ′ denote the sequence of primes assigned to the classes in V (recall that the sequence pub′ of integers can be easily computed from pr ′,
with at most O(|V ′|2) operations), as follows:
Algorithm STATATv (1
τ ,G′, pr ′, corr ′v)
1. Construct an input instance for STATHLu (1




v∈V dv mod n, as follows
(a) Let G = G′;
(b) Let pr = pr ′;
(c) Let u = v be the class to be attacked;
(d) Let corru = corr ′v be the keys held by corrupted classes;
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Fig. 2. The graph Gγ = (Vγ , Eγ ), where V = {a, b, c} and E = {(a, b), (a, c)}.
2. Let kHLu be the output of STAT
HL
u on inputs (1
τ ,G, pr, corru);
3. Output kATu = kHLu .
STATATv has exactly the same advantage in breaking theAkl–Taylor scheme thatSTAT
HL
u has in breaking theHarn–Lin scheme. Therefore,
the theorem follows from Theorem 4.2. 
Notice that we can consider the random primes choice for the Harn–Lin scheme. Along the same lines of the proof of Theorem 6.1, we can
show that the corresponding scheme is secure under the random exponent RSA assumption.
7. Towards security w.r.t. key indistinguishability
In this section we show how to construct a key assignment scheme which is secure with respect to key indistinguishability, starting
from a key assignment scheme which guarantees security against key recovery. Our construction uses the Goldreich–Levin hard-core bit
(GL bit) [11], since the GL bit is a natural candidate for turning hardness of computation into indistinguishability.
Let τ be a security parameter. Given two strings x = x1 · · · xγ and r = r1 · · · rγ of length γ polynomially bounded in τ , the GL bit Br (x)
corresponds to the inner product (mod 2) of x and r , i.e., Br (x) = ∑γi=1 xi · ri mod 2. Let f be a one-way permutation and let Pred be a
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input f (x) and r tries to guess the bit Br (x). The advantage of Pred in guessing Br (x) from
f (x) and r , where x and r are uniformly chosen in {0, 1}τ , is defined as
AdvPred(1τ ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Pred(1τ , f (x), r) = Br (x)] − 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Goldreich and Levin [11] showed that, for every one-way permutation f , given f (x) and r , it is infeasible to guess Br (x) with non-
negligible advantage. They also showed that, given a polynomial-time algorithm which guesses Br (x) with non-negligible advantage, it
is possible to reconstruct x with non-negligible probability by using the so-called Goldreich-Levin reconstruction algorithm (see [10] for
details):
Theorem 7.1 ([11]). Let x, r ∈ {0, 1}poly(τ ). Given an oracle that, on input r and f (x), predicts the value of Br (x)with advantage (τ ) (over the
choice of r) in time t(τ ), there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm R with running time O( τ
2·t(τ )
(τ )2
) that retrieves x with probability
at leastΩ((τ )).
Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies, let τ be a security parameter and let γ be polynomially
bounded in τ . For each graph G = (V , E) in Γ we define a graph transformation, whose output, denoted by Gγ = (Vγ , Eγ ), is called the
γ -extended graph for G. We denote by Γγ the family of γ -extended graphs for elements in Γ . The transformation works as follows:
• For each u ∈ V , we place a class u0 along with γ additional classes u1, . . . , uγ , called the classes associated to u, in Vγ ;
• For each class u ∈ V , we place the edge (ui, ui+1), for i = 0, . . . , γ − 1, in Eγ ;
• For each (u, v) ∈ E, we place the edge (u0, v0) in Eγ .
Fig. 2 shows an example of the γ -extended graph for G = (V , E), where V = {a, b, c} and E = {(a, b), (a, c)}.
Let τ be a security parameter and let γ be polynomially bounded in τ . Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered
hierarchies, letΓγ be the family of extended graphs for elements inΓ , and let (Gen′,Der ′) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme forΓγ .
Nowwe are ready to describe the proposed key assignment scheme. LetG ∈ Γ ,Gγ ∈ Γγ , and let the symbol ◦ denote string concatenation.
Algorithm Gen(1τ ,G)
1. Construct the γ -extended graph Gγ = (Vγ , Eγ ) for G = (V , E);
2. Let (s′, k′, pub′) be the output of Gen′ on inputs (1τ ,Gγ );
3. Randomly choose a string r ∈ {0, 1}γ ;
4. For each class u ∈ V , let su = s′u0 ;
5. For each class u ∈ V , compute the key ku as follows:
ku = Br (k′u1 ) ◦ Br (k′u2 ) ◦ · · · ◦ Br (k′uγ );
6. Let s and k be the sequences of private information and keys, respectively, computed in the previous steps;
7. Let pub = (pub′, r);
8. Output (s, k, pub).
Algorithm Der(1τ ,G, u, v, su, pub)
1. Let pub = (pub′, r);
2. For i = 1, . . . , γ , let k′vi be the output of Der ′ on inputs (1τ ,Gγ , u0, vi, s′u, pub′);
3. Compute kv = Br (k′v1 ) ◦ Br (k′v2 ) ◦ · · · ◦ Br (k′vγ ).
Intuitively, since, for each i = 1, . . . , γ , it is infeasible to guess Br (kui ) with non-negligible advantage, an adversary for a class u ∈ V
has no information about even a single bit of the key ku.
The next theorem states that if (Gen′,Der ′) is secure against key recovery, then (Gen,Der) is secure with respect to key
indistinguishability.
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Theorem 7.2. If (Gen′,Der ′) is secure in the sense of REC-ST, then (Gen,Der) is secure in the sense of IND-ST.
Proof. The proof uses a standard hybrid argument. Let G = (V , E) be a graph in Γ , let u ∈ V , and let STATINDu be a static adversary
attacking class u. In order to prove the theorem, we need to show that the adversary’s views in experiments ExpIND−1STATu and Exp
IND−0
STATu are
indistinguishable. We construct a sequence of γ + 1 experiments Exp1u, . . . , Expγ+1u , all defined over the same probability space. In each
experiment we modify the way the view of STATINDu is computed, while maintaining the view’s distributions indistinguishable between
any two consecutive experiments. For i = 1, . . . , γ + 1, experiment Expiu is defined as follows:
Experiment Expiu(1
τ ,G)
(s, hi, pub)← Geni(1τ ,G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)
d← STATINDu (1τ ,G, pub, corru, hiu)
return d
Algorithm Geni used in experiment Expiu is algorithm Genwith the following modification: the last input to STAT
IND
u is the string
hiu = ρ1 ◦ · · · ◦ ρi−1 ◦ Br (k′ui ) ◦ Br (k′ui+1 ) ◦ · · · ◦ Br (k′uγ ),
where ρ1, . . . , ρi−1 are random bits chosen independently according to the uniform distribution.
Notice that experiment Exp1u is the same as Exp
IND−1
STATu . Indeed, the last input to the adversary STAT
IND
u is the string h
1
u = Br (k′u1 ) ◦ · · · ◦
Br (k′uγ ), corresponding to the key held by class u. On the other hand, experiment Exp
γ+1
u is the same as Exp
IND−0
STATu . Indeed, the last input
to adversary STATINDu is the string h
γ+1
u = ρ1 ◦ · · · ◦ ργ , i.e., a random string of the same length as ku.
We show that, for any i = 1, . . . , γ , the adversary’s view in the ith experiment is indistinguishable from the adversary’s view in the
(i+ 1)th one. Hence, it follows that also the adversary’s views in experiments ExpIND−1STATu and ExpIND−0STATu are indistinguishable.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm Di which is able to distinguish between the views in
experiments Expiu and Exp
i+1
u with non-negligible advantage
AdvINDDi (1
τ ,G) = |Pr[Expiu(1τ ,G) = 1] − Pr[Expi+1u (1τ ,G) = 1]|.
Assume, without loss of generality, that for infinitely many τ ’s,
Pr[Expiu(1τ ,G) = 1] − Pr[Expi+1u (1τ ,G) = 1] ≥ (τ ).
We show how to use the algorithm Di to break the security of the scheme (Gen′,Der ′) in the sense of REC-ST. More precisely, we use Di
to construct an algorithm Pred that, on inputs (1τ ,Gγ , pub′, r, corr ′ui ), predicts the value Br (k
′
ui )with non-negligible advantage. Then, by
Theorem 7.1, using Pred as an oracle, we construct an adversary STATRECu which reconstructs the key k
′
ui with non-negligible probability.
The algorithm Pred, on inputs (1τ ,Gγ , pub′, r, corr ′ui ),works as follows:
• Sets pub = (pub′, r);
• Constructs the private information corru from the private information corr ′ui , by removing from corr ′ui the private information held by
all classes in V ′ \ V ;
• Constructs the challenge hu as follows:
– Independently and uniformly at random chooses i bits b1, . . . , bi;
– Invokes Der ′ on inputs (1τ ,Gγ , u0, uj, s′uj , pub
′) to compute the key k′uj , for j = i+ 1, . . . , γ ;
– Uses the random string r to compute Br (k′uj ), for j = i+ 1, . . . , γ ;
– Sets hu = b1 ◦ · · · ◦ bi ◦ Br (k′ui+1 ) ◦ · · · ◦ Br (k′uγ );• Invokes Di on input (1τ ,G, pub, corru, hu). If the output of Di is 1, then Pred outputs bi, else, Pred outputs 1− bi.
Let us evaluate the success probability of Pred. To avoid overburdening the notation, we denote by Di(hu) the invocation of Di on
inputs (1τ ,G, pub, corru, hu). Moreover, we denote by z the string
b1 ◦ · · · ◦ bi−1 ◦ 1− Br (k′ui ) ◦ Br (k′ui+1 ) ◦ · · · ◦ Br (k′uγ ).
Notice that if the bit bi in the string hu happens to be equal to Br (k′ui ), then hu = hiu, whereas, if bi is equal to 1 − Br (k′ui ), then hu = z. It
holds that
Prob(Pred(1τ ,Gγ , pub′, r, corr ′ui ) = Br (k′ui ))
= Prob[Di(hu) = 1 and bi = Br (k′ui )] + Prob[Di(hu) = 0 and bi = 1− Br (k′ui )]
= Prob[Di(hu) = 1|bi = Br (k′ui )] · Prob[bi = Br (k′ui )] +
Prob[Di(hu) = 0|bi = 1− Br (k′ui )] · Prob[bi = 1− Br (k′vi )]
= 1
2
· {Prob[Di(hu) = 1|bi = Br (k′ui )] + Prob[Di(hu) = 0|bi = 1− Br (k′ui )]}
(since bi is chosen uniformly at random)
= 1
2
· {Prob[Di(hiu) = 1] + Prob[Di(z) = 0]}
= 1
2
· {Prob[Di(hiu) = 1] + (1− Prob[Di(z) = 1])}. (3)
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It is easy to check that
Prob[Di(hi+1u ) = 1] =
1
2




Indeed, Pr[bi = Br (k′ui )] = Pr[bi = 1− Br (k′ui )] = 1/2. Thus,
Prob[Di(z) = 1] = 2 · {Prob[Di(hi+1u ) = 1] − Prob[Di(hiu) = 1]}.
Therefore, from equality (3) it follows that
Prob(Pred(1τ ,G′, pub′, r, corr ′ui ) = Br (k′ui ))
= 1
2
· {Prob[Di(hiu) = 1] + (1− 2 · Prob[Di(hi+1u ) = 1]
+ Prob[Di(hiu) = 1])}
= 1
2
· {1+ 2 · (Prob[Di(hiu) = 1] − Prob[Di(hi+1u ) = 1])}
= 1
2




Thus, Pred predicts the value Br (k′ui )with advantage at least (τ ). At this point, we can construct an adversary STAT
REC
ui which, on inputs
(1τ ,Gτ , pub′, corr ′ui ), computes k
′
ui by using the Goldreich–Levin reconstruction algorithm R. STAT
REC
ui works as follows:
• Starts running the Goldreich–Levin reconstruction algorithm R;
• Whenever asked for Brj (k′ui ), for a certain random string rj, it invokes Pred(1τ ,Gγ , pub′, rj, corr ′ui ) and gives its output to R;• Outputs whatever R outputs.
By Theorem 7.1, the Goldreich–Levin reconstruction algorithm R computes the value k′ui with probability Ω((τ )), since Pred predicts
Br (k′ui )with advantage at least (τ ).
Therefore, STATRECui computes the key held by class ui with non-negligible advantage. This is a contradiction, since the scheme
(Gen′,Der ′) is secure in the sense of REC-ST.
Hence, a distinguisher Di, with non-negligible advantage, cannot exist. Therefore, for any i = 1, . . . , γ , the view in the ith experiment
is indistinguishable from the view in the (i + 1)th one. It follows that the adversary’s view in experiment ExpIND−1STATu is indistinguishable
from the adversary’s view in experiment ExpIND−0STATu . This concludes the proof. 
8. An Akl–Taylor key indistinguishable scheme
In Section 4.1 we have shown that the Akl–Taylor scheme is secure in the sense of REC-ST under either the random exponent or the
fixed exponent RSA assumption. Thus, such a scheme can be used as a building block in the construction of Section 7, in order to obtain a
key assignment scheme which is secure in the sense of IND-ST under the same assumption.
Notice that the Akl–Taylor scheme cannot be proven secure in the sense of IND-ST. Indeed, any adversarywhich attacks class u knows
the key kv associated to a class v child of class u. In order to check if a value ρ corresponds to the key ku the adversary only needs to test
whether ρtv/tu is equal to kv .
In the following we evaluate the parameters of the scheme obtained by using the construction proposed in Section 7 when the
underlying scheme is the Akl–Taylor scheme with the MacKinnon et al. assignment and the random choice of primes. Let τ be a security
parameter and let γ = 2τ be the key length. The amount of public information in the resulting scheme corresponds to the |V |(1 + γ )
integers tv ’s associated to the classes in Vγ , in addition to themodulus n and the γ -bit string r . On the other hand, the construction requires
each class to store one secret value, corresponding to its private information. Finally, a class u, which wants to compute the key held by
a class v ∈ Au has to perform γ modular exponentiations, to compute the keys kv1 , . . . , kvγ , and γ inner products modulo 2, to compute
the GL bits Br (kv1 ), . . . , Br (kvγ ). The parameters of the Akl–Taylor key indistinguishable scheme are summarized in the first row of Fig. 4.
Assume that, in the MacKinnon et al. assignment, the graph Gγ = (Vγ , Eγ ) ∈ Γγ is decomposed into |V | disjoint chains of length
γ + 1, where each chain contains a class u ∈ V along with its associated classes u1, . . . , uγ . According to the results stated in Section 4.2,
the amount of public information required by the Akl–Taylor scheme with the MacKinnon et al. assignment and the modified random
prime choice can be reduced to a single prime number, in addition to the modulus n. As explained in Section 4.2, this requires each class
to perform on average O(|V | · γ ) steps to compute the sequence of primes assigned to the V chains and O(|V | · γ ) products, to compute
the prime powers associated to the γ additional classes of each chain. Moreover, the sequence of integers t ′vs associated to classes in Vγ
can be computed by performing O(|V |2) products.
9. Conclusions and summary of the results
Wehave analyzed theAkl–Taylor scheme aswell as someof its variantswith respect to security and efficiency requirements.Motivated
by the fact that the Akl–Taylor scheme is not secure w.r.t. key indistinguishability, we have proposed a general construction to setup
a key assignment scheme secure w.r.t. key indistinguishability, given any key assignment scheme secure against key recovery. Such a
construction is of independent interest and may be useful for different instantiations.
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Fig. 3. Comparison between key assignment schemes which are secure in the sense of REC-ST. Akl–Taylor schemes using the modified random primes
choice are not shown.
Fig. 4. Comparison between key assignment schemes which are secure in the sense of IND-ST. Akl–Taylor schemes using the modified random primes
choice are not shown.
Figs. 3 and 4 show comparisons between our constructions and previous proposals for key assignment schemes secure in the sense
of REC-ST [3,4] and in the sense of IND-ST [3,4,8], respectively. The comparisons take into account the amount of public and private
information, the number and the type of operations required to perform key derivation, and the computational assumption. We denote
by dist(u, v) the length of the shortest path from u to v.
Atallah et al. [3] proposed a first construction based on pseudorandom functions (PRF) and a second one requiring PRF and a
CCA-secure symmetric encryption scheme. Ateniese et al. proposed two constructions, which we refer to as the Two-Level Encryption
Based Construction (TLEBC) and the Two-Level Pairing Based Construction (TLPBC). The TLEBCmakes use of a symmetric encryption scheme
secure either against plaintext recovery (PR-P1-C0), or against plaintext indistinguishability (IND-P1-C0). The TLPBC [4] makes use of
pairings and assumes the intractability of either the Bilinear Diffie–Hellmanproblem (BDH) or the Bilinear Decisional Diffie–Hellmanproblem
(BDDH). A different construction, called the Dynamic Encryption Based Construction (DEBC), making use of an IND-P1-C0 symmetric
encryption scheme, was proposed in [8]. Finally, the Broadcast Encryption Based Construction (BEBC) proposed in [8] makes use of a
public-key broadcast encryption scheme and assumes the intractability of the |V |-Bilinear Decisional Diffie–Hellman Exponent problem
(|V |-BDDHE).
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